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Redesigning Public Sector Pensions In Developing Countries
Olivia S. Mitchell
Abstract

Pensions in the public sector cover state, municipal, and federal government employees in addition to
workers in publicly-managed enterprises. Until recently, the most prominent model for public employee
pension plans in both developed and developing economies was the defined benefit (DB) plan.
Nevertheless, the status quo is now changing as public plans are being asked to catch up with global
changes in labor and capital markets. As a consequence, defined contribution (DC) pensions are now
making headway in many cases as an alternative or sometimes an additional pillar of public employees’
retirement systems. This paper examines public pension plan design and management decisions in
developing countries, beginning by identifying the key functions of a pension plan and the range of
structures implemented as well as their economic effects. We then discuss the rationales for and means of
moving to a funded public pension system, including the problems associated with underfunding and the
ways in which accrued rights can be financed and managed, with attention to the range of stakeholders in
a public pension system. Finally we explore governance and investment issues in the context of public
pension plans. A number of public pension changes exist that could contribute materially to the
strengthening of the pension promise in developing nations, while making the plans more equitable, more
economically efficient, and more financially solvent. These reforms could benefit not only the employer
and employee groups most directly associated with public pension systems, but they can also enhance the
wellbeing of broader groups including taxpayers and consumers on whom the burden of high taxes and
reduced public services ultimately fall.
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Redesigning Public Sector Pensions
In Developing Countries
A recent review of civil service pension programs in 53 different countries found that many
public employee retirement systems are headed toward, or are already in, a state of financial collapse
(World Bank, 2000). The purpose of this study is to identify steps in the design and management arena
that might help make such public sector pension systems more viable in developing countries. We also
outline potential lessons for countries seeking to reform financially insolvent and economically inefficient
pensions covering public sector workers.
The discussion is divided into several sections. In the first and second sections, we describe the
most important rationales for pensions and the main objectives of public sector pension systems. Next,
we explore public pension design and structure, focusing on the types of plans and their diverse objectives
and impacts. Then we turn to a discussion of organizational and intergovernmental considerations in
public pension plan management, examining the stakeholders and implications for political economy.
This leads naturally to the topic of public plan governance where we evaluate the role of pension trustees
and pension fiduciary standards. From this subject, we move to an assessment of investment objectives
and behavior in public pension plans. In the final sections, we offer an evaluation of challenges specific to
the public pension sector and link this discussion with implications for the public pension environment in
developing countries.
I. The Rationale for Pension Plans
Before proceeding to explore public sector pensions in detail, it is important to clarify what a
pension plan is, how it works, and whom it benefits.
A. What is a pension plan?
At its core, a pension plan is a long-term financial contract that promises to pay a retiring worker
a sum of money intended to support old-age consumption.1 It is conventional to distinguish between
defined contribution (DC) and defined benefit (DB) plans when discussing such plans, since they take
different forms and imply different costs and risk-sharing. In the DC case, the sponsor promises to deposit
a specified contribution into the plan periodically (e.g. per pay period), and the plan participant (the
employee) bears capital market risk associated with the investment returns on that deposit. By contrast, in
the DB case, the sponsor promises to pay the retiree a specified benefit (often as a function of pay and
years of service; see McGill et al., 1996), and in this case the sponsor bears the risk of setting aside funds
adequate to pay the promise.
1
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Contribution formulas in DC plans vary widely. Private employer plans in the US have combined
employer and employee contribution rates of 6-8% of employee pay while teacher pensions often have
joint contribution rates of 12-14%. In other countries, DC rates also span the range, at around 10% of pay
in Chile and Australia for mandatory contributions and higher in Singapore, where the mandatory
contribution has been as high as 40% of pay. In a funded DC plan, usually the monies are invested in
stocks, bonds, or other financial instruments at the participant’s direction (though in Singapore and other
provident funds the federal government generally invests the funds as a block without participant
discretion). On retirement, the DC participant will typically be permitted to convert his accumulation into
an annuity payable from retirement until death (or the death of the spouse, if a joint and survivor benefit is
selected). It is also common to allow DC participants to take some or all of the pension accrual in the
form of a lump sum. This sum may then be spent immediately, or invested individually and then drawn
down based on anticipated life expectancy (this is the “programmed withdrawal” or “minimum
distribution” notion seen, for instance, in the Chilean and Mexican pension systems).
By contrast, the DB plan sponsor typically specifies the pension promise by defining a benefit
formula that determines a participant’s eventual retirement payments. For instance, a formula for a
retirement benefit amount (B) payable in year t, to a retiree age A who retired at age R could be
formulated as follows:
Benefit = Bt|A,R = b(YRS,FAP, A)*YRS*FAP,
where the benefit B depends on the worker’s retirement age, his years of service at that point (YRS), and
his final average pay (FAP). Here the term b(•) is a function transforming the worker’s age at retirement,
service, and pay into a benefit amount. This function might be a smooth one (e.g. 1% of pay per year of
service) but more commonly it provides for higher benefits at longer years of service or for pay earned
above some threshold (Fields and Mitchell, 1984). In the case of a funded DB plan, the plan sponsor is
expected to contribute to the plan in an orderly fashion according to actuarial standards, so the needed
funds are available when the worker retires. Generally a defined benefit pension is payable in the form of
an annuity, though sometimes an employer will permit a lump sum cash-out equal to the discounted
present value of the future benefit.
In well-run pension systems, contributions flowing into both DB and DC pension accounts tend
to be sheltered from income tax at the time the contributions are made, and frequently, investment
earnings building up inside the pension fund can also accumulate on a pre-tax basis. When this is so, the
pension plan is said to be “tax qualified” – where contributions and within-plan build-ups are not subject
to tax until retirement.2 Having a tax-deferral aspect of pensions is clearly valuable to employees in a
2
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high marginal tax bracket and whenever the plan is funded (i.e., when it has substantial assets to back
pension liabilities).
In many cases, a pension plan’s assets must be segregated from the sponsoring employer’s own
assets, held in trust on the participants’ behalf.3 If so, the DC plan’s assets are by definition equal to plan
liabilities, since participants have full claim on what is deposited in the plan via contributions, and also on
investment earnings. By contrast in the DB case, in many countries plan participants are considered to
“own” the promised benefit, but the plan might not be fully backed by sufficient assets to pay future
benefits. When this occurs, current contributions may be used to support current retirees, at least in part.
This type of DB plan is characterized as underfunded; in the extreme case where no assets at all are set
aside, the plan is known as a “pay-as-you-go” (PAYGO) pension.4
B. Who benefits from having a pension plan?
Workers and their employers both reap economic rewards from having a pension plan. Being
covered by a pension has been demonstrated to help during both the accumulation and the decumulation
phases of retirement saving. Employees like pensions because they serve as a “self-control” device,
representing a pre-commitment method of saving for retirement on an automatic basis. Cost-savings
associated with group pensions are also substantial (Mitchell, 1998), meaning that scale economies can
make it more cost-effective to save in a large pooled fund than on one’s own. Additionally, many
countries offer a degree of tax protection to pension contributions, pension plan investment earnings, and
even pension payouts. These can be very important in reducing savers’ lifetime tax burdens and
providing an additional incentive to accumulate assets in a retirement vehicle. In developed countries,
pension saving has been shown to be fairly sensitive to tax deferral practices, with estimated tax
elasticities ranging from –0.3 to –0.8 (Gustman et al. 1994), meaning that a 10% reduction in taxes levied
on pensions could boost pension saving by around 3-8%. While no empirical elasticities have been
estimated of this type for developing countries, they may well be even larger, in view of the additional
opportunities for system participants to evade taxes in a country with a large informal labor market.
Finally, having a pension plan that pays out benefits in the form of a life annuity affords workers
with protection against longevity risk, by pooling mortality risk across others. People lacking access to
pensions paid out in the form of an annuity run the risk of either spending too little so as not to outlive
their assets, or overconsuming and ending up in poverty in old age. Participating in a pension that pays
3
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lifetime benefits can be quite valuable, in this event, particularly when adverse selection makes individual
annuity purchases more expensive than group purchases (Brown et al., 1999).
Employers also have several reasons to consider pensions a valuable element of the compensation
package. Clearly any element of compensation – including pension contributions – cannot be seen as a
“free” good from the employer perspective. That is, a larger pension promise offered for the future must
be traded off for lower wages or some other type of compensation. Tempering this tradeoff is the fact that
some employers consider pensions as being more valuable than wages, particularly when deferred
compensation alters worker behavior in a productivity-enhancing way. This has been demonstrated for
DB pensions, where pension accruals are deferred until late in a worker’s career. Such deferral has the
effect of inducing the employee to remain employed until the company’s desired retirement age, and then
to retire after that (Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 2000). But as globalization induces workforce mobility and
puts pressure on plan costs over time, fewer employees will be able to plan on remaining with any one
employer for an entire worklife. As a result, the traditional appeal of the DB promise is fading. Indeed,
recent policy discussions in the European Community have indicated that an international defined
contribution pension system for the EU may be a cost-effective model for the integrated economic system
of the future. Others have suggested that a regional pension model for Central and perhaps South America
could be devised in the decade to come.
A different way in which a pension plan can be used as a personnel tool occurs when the
employer offers a deferred match in the firm’s DC program, where the employee is “vested” or legally
entitled to the match only after some specified number of years with the company. In the US case, for
instance, a 401(k) plan can provide a pension match that may take several years to be vested. In this way,
the employer will structure the pension to attract, retain, and pay more to those who subsequently reveal
themselves to be low-turnover, and hence more highly productive, employees.5
In summary, in this section we have shown that pensions are highly complex and long-term
financial promises that are appreciated by employees for their risk-pooling, scale economics, tax-deferral
and self-control attributes. Employers too value them as important personnel tools, to attract, motivate,
and retain workers in accordance with desired employment patterns.

II. Pensions in the Public Sector
In this section we turn to an examination of pensions in the public sector in greater detail. First
we ask which types of employees are covered by public sector pensions and what types of benefits they
are likely to receive. Next we ask why public sector employers offer pensions instead of paying more in
5
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cash. The section concludes with an evaluation of why public pensions are the subject of such intensive
interest and attention of late.
A. Who is a public sector employee?
In theory, the beneficiaries of public sector pension plans should be easy to identify and
distinguish from those covered by private sector retirement schemes: the former includes employees of
public sector firms, while the latter cover employees in the for-profit and not-for-profit private sectors. In
practice, however, the distinction between these employee types and the pensions covering them may
become blurred. For example, it is logical to include in an accounting of public sector employees all
federal, state, and provincial workers as well as municipal and local employees. It also should include
uniformed government employees (e.g. police, firefighters), those with special skills or employed in
public sector jobs (e.g. judges, teachers, medical doctors, miners).6
Where the issue becomes more clouded is in the inclusion (or exclusion) of people working for
employers having a mixed status such as state-owned businesses and/or joint-ventures between a private
firm and a government agency. This definitional problem is particularly complex in developing countries
where large government-run firms command vast human and physical resources via parastatal
organizations. In some countries, such as in the Caribbean, many important national industries are
managed by Statutory Boards, government-run but quasi-independent organizations that are neither
completely private nor completely controlled by one government agency. Further, as globalization
proceeds, the traditional boundaries between areas once deemed perfectly under the purview of either the
public or the private sectors are being eroded. Thus some government activities have been “outsourced”
to private sector firms, where tasks that were once deemed solely governmental responsibilities (such as
prison management, utilities, refuse collection, and even education) are increasingly being carried out by
private sector firms under government contracts.
Such structural changes may make it difficult for governments to differentiate clearly between
employees of the public and private sector. The further implication in the present context is that it is
becoming increasingly difficult to determine exactly who participates in a public pension system (and
indeed, what a public sector job is, in some cases!). As a result, many government organizations are
recognizing that a key step in undertaking public sector pension reform is to evaluate the numbers and
types of people covered by a public sector pension plan and then to determine their potential benefit
liability. This process becomes quite difficult when payroll and personnel records have not been well
maintained and are not computerized. In addition, when pension promises differ by type, location, and
6
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level of worker, as well as over time, it becomes complicated to sort out what the systematic pension
liability actually is across a range of public employees. As a case in point, recent research on four state
pension plans in Brazil showed that promised public pension liabilities cannot currently be computed in
some cases because records and data are too limited to permit a detailed actuarial assessment of all the
different governmental groups covered by the pension system (e.g. Rio de Janeiro; cf Rabelo 2000).
A related problem only recently recognized in the public sector pension context is that in many
countries, pension plans have promised to provide much more than just a retirement benefit (e.g. in
Brazil, see Pimentel Asociados ND). In addition to retirement benefits, some plans provide survivors’
insurance, disability benefit coverage, and even health insurance. In other cases, the pension system may
be required to offer participant loans, a practice that generates substantial additional plan costs in both the
US and India. While there may be some economies of scope, this has yet to be demonstrated
convincingly. More often, asking a pension plan to do too many things can sow confusion regarding the
multiple nature of the risks insured, the risk financing problems that are consequently generated, and
substantial administrative costs. In addition, this lack of transparency muddies the waters for accounting
purposes and it makes it extremely difficult to do clean forecasting of the pension plan’s future
obligations to retiring workers.
B. Are public pensions different from those in the private sector?
Public employers offer pension plans to their employees for many of the same reasons discussed
above – namely because the employees appreciate them, and the sponsors can reap productivity rewards
from doing so. But the story is often also rather more complex in the public sector, since public sector
employees are sometimes paid on scales that differ markedly from those of private sector workers.
Differential treatment can occur for a range of reasons, some of which are related to market
factors and others of which are not (Ehrenberg and Schwarz, 1986). For example, public sector
employees may be better educated than average, and hence they tend to command a wage higher than
lesser-educated private sector workers. Another is that some public sector jobs may be more risky (e.g.
police, military), more physically demanding (e.g. firefighters), or require special attributes (e.g. top level
security), making it necessary for public sector to offer these employees additional pay as a compensating
premium to get people to take these jobs. Non-market factors also play a role in explaining public-private
pay differences. A prominent consideration here is that public sector workers in many countries tend to
be highly unionized, and hence they are able to extract “rent” in the form of higher pay, by having
government employers pass on higher labor costs to taxpayers (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994).
As a result of both market and nonmarket factors, public sector workers tend to earn at least as
much as their private sector equivalents and frequently more. At the top of the skill ladder, however,
there are sometimes politically-imposed pay caps restricting government workers from earning salaries
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equivalent to what they could command in the private-sector (Ippolito, 1997). This lack of alignment
between public and private pay levels therefore can generate queues for entry-level government jobs, and
workers show low turnover after that; by contrast, people in higher-level jobs sometimes find they must
leave government service in order to have their pay restored to their market value (Smith, 1977).
Alternatively, the pension benefit is sometimes set above that which would be earned in the private sector,
to “compensate” the more skilled public sector employee for his lower cash salary.
When there are important differences across several aspects of public and private compensation,
this makes the task of evaluating public pensions somewhat complex. Specifically the general question to
be kept in mind is whether public sector workers are compensated equitably and efficiently, taking into
account all aspects of pay and working conditions (including job security), rather than only how cash
salaries or pensions alone compare. And specific aspects of the pensions can work in opposite directions.
To illustrate this last point we note that state and local employees in the US are required to work
longer before they gain a legal (vested) right to a pension benefit, with 43% having to work at least 10
years before becoming vested, whereas in the private sector 85% vest after only 5 years (Mitchell et al.
2000). Offsetting this policy is the fact that many public sector plans are permitted “purchase of service”
credits, where a public employee who moves from one job to another within a state can purchase credit
for past service under the plan on the new job. This is a form of benefit flexibility virtually unknown in
private sector DB plans. Other aspects also differentiate public from private pensions, including the
definition of earnings used in the benefit formula. Some 61% of US public-sector pensions use the last
three years of an employee’s earnings career to determine his benefit amount, while private plans tend to
use five years to determine the fraction of pay used in the benefit formula (78%). State and local pension
formulas also adopt a higher benefit multiplier per year of service worked, with 43% providing a benefit
accumulation of 2+ percent of pay per year of service, while only 7% of private plans were this generous.
What all this means, of course, is that it is essential to translate the various different benefit
features into a common metric that measures the full economic cost of the offered benefit. A periodic
public-private pay comparison study of the sort undertaken by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics is likely
to be worthwhile to this end.7 Only with such a systematic, periodic survey would it be possible to
7
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compare compensation packages and pension plans with different features across private and public
sectors. In turn this is needed to determine how benefits with different features can be compared to cash
compensation. Otherwise it may be difficult to judge whether, on the surface, one or another provision is
substantially costly or different across sectors to the employer providing the benefit.8
Another reason it may be difficult to compare public with private pension plans directly is that the
two types of plans could have dramatically different funding positions, with private plans often better
backed but public plans undersupported by earmarked assets. To the extent that a pension is underfunded,
this makes it uncertain as to whether the participant will actually receive his promised full benefit,
whether it will be paid out on time, whether it will be protected from inflation, and whether it will
continue until death. Such extensive uncertainty undermines credibility regarding the entire compensation
structure for public employees, in some cases leading workers to demand a risk premium for their
underfunded pensions (Smith, 1981). Some argue this difference in funding can arise because politicians
make benefit promises without pre-financing them, and taxpayers seem unaware of the likely later tax
consequences of such open-ended promises (Mitchell and Smith, 1994; Inman, 1982, 1986, 1990).
In any event, public sector pension promises in almost every country are less well supported by
segregated assets than private plans, and in some cases they have been drained of all assets, subsisting
instead on whatever revenues can be found to keep them going on a PAYGO basis. Of course
underfunded promises can have a long-term deleterious effect on municipal, state, and even national
credibility, undermining bond ratings and bringing down local property values (Eppel and Shipper, 1981).
Evidently, when politicians offer pension promises that they cannot back with assets, this can have quite a
negative effect on not only public sector employees, but potentially on broader groups of stakeholders as
well.
C. Why reform public sector pensions?
Several rationales motivate public pension reform around the world. As noted at the outset, one
is practical: the fact is that many of these systems face insolvency currently or in the not-too-distant
such as lump-sum payments provided in place of wage increases, shift differentials, and premium pay for overtime
and weekend work; these payments are included in the benefits component. Benefits include: paid leave--vacations,
holidays, sick leave, and other leave; supplemental pay--premium pay for work in addition to the regular work
schedule (such as overtime, weekends, and holidays), shift differentials, nonproduction bonuses, and lump sum
payments provided in place of wage increases; insurance--life, health, short-term disability, and long-term disability;
retirement and savings--defined benefit and defined contribution plans; legally required benefits--Social Security,
Federal and State unemployment insurance, and Workers' Compensation; and other benefits--severance pay and
supplemental unemployment benefits.” Further information on the survey is available at
http://stats.bls.gov/ecthome.htm.
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and Kaplan (1999).
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future, and if benefits are to be paid, something will have to be done to render their financing viable. A
related rationale for reform is macroeconomic: moving to a funded system could boost household and
national saving. Feldstein’s theoretical research on social security and saving (1974) illustrated that
unfunded old-age benefit promises depress saving when workers consume more believing that future
cohorts of workers will support their old-age benefits. By contrast, a funded system could produce
increased saving, and with it additional growth.
Many researchers have sought to measure the practical importance of macroeconomic benefits of
pension reform, though the empirical evidence is far from conclusive. In the developed economy context,
analysts believe that the effect of funded pensions on aggregate savings is positive, but the positive effect
has proved to be relatively small (c.f. Engen and Gale, 2000). In the developing country context, only a
handful of empirical studies have been undertaken, largely due to data limitations. An aggregate panel
study by Reisen (2000) comparing developed and developing countries finds no positive effect of
pensions on aggregate saving among the OECD nations which contrasts with a strong and statistically
significant positive effect for the non-OECD countries he examines. Nevertheless the dataset used for that
analysis was restricted to 6 developed and 6 non-OECD nations, the latter including only Chile, Korea,
Malaysia, Singapore. Whether his findings would generalize to the larger set of funded pension in
developing nations is unknown. Holzmann (1997) argues on theoretical grounds that the macroeconomic
effect of funding a developing country public pension plan could be quite positive for two reasons. One
is that moving from an unfunded to a funded system can generate positive economic externalities,
including the promotion of deeper, more completive, and more liquid financial markets (Holzmann 1998).
Another reason is that unfunded schemes often embody only a weak link (if any) between taxes paid by
workers and benefits received, meaning that the pension system may impart important labor market
distortions reducing efficiency and productivity. To the extent these distortions are large and the negative
externalities can be reduced with pension reform, this too justifies moving to a pension scheme where
there are tighter links between the benefits and contributions – as in a DC rather than a DB pension plan.
Another rationale for public pension reform is that some countries may require realignment in
public versus private sector workers’ pay and benefit levels, as part of a wider move to “reinvent
government”. The latter term generally involves implementing modern human resources and incentivebased performance-motivated pay techniques that have become the norm in private sector workplaces
(Reid, 1992).
Related to this point are the underlying changes sweeping both domestic and global labor
markets. As the workplace continues to become more dynamic, employees more mobile, and jobs more
flexible, pensions may need to be reformed to “keep up”. In the past, however, public sector employment
was always depicted as the antithesis of the “new workplace”, rewarding long-term permanent workers
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who rarely had their performance evaluated or their pay linked to performance, who rarely undertook
additional training after hire, and who never left their jobs prior to retirement. In the future, by contrast,
the nature of public employment in every country is likely to be revamped, with regard to both skill and
technological requirements. More public sector workers will likely find that they might not wish to
remain with a single public employer for life, preferring instead to obtain a range of skills and exposures
to alternative work environments to increase job opportunities and build training expertise. Finding ways
to permit and even enhance opportunities for labor mobility is compatible with public pension reform, in
the eyes of those who would like to make public sector employment more responsive to customer as well
as employee desires and needs.
Another labor market factor driving public pension reform in some countries has been workers’
growing interest in investing their retirement funds on their own. The growth of 401(k) pensions
permitted millions of US private sector employees to diversify their retirement portfolios, to the point
where about half the population now owns some equities in their portfolios. Public sector workers too
have begun to push for similar investment access for their retirement funds; US federal employees are
now permitted to invest their saving plan assets in a range of capital market funds, and additional ones are
being introduced on a periodic basis. Most recently in Japan, the government has announced that a
401(k)-type pension model will be rolled out in 2001 (Mitchell, 1999).
Of course, there are many additional motivations for public pension reform, and one prominent
one is taxpayer desire to redirect the way governments spend taxpayer funds. Throughout the Americas,
it has been recognized that public pension plans are increasingly imposing ever-higher burdens on
government budgets already facing a cash-flow crisis. In Brazil, for instance, paying pension benefits
commands such a large fraction of some states’ revenue that very little financing remains to cover
education, roadwork, public health, and other demands on the fiscal budget (World Bank, 2000).
A related motive for pension reform flows from a worldwide movement to privatize enterprises
previously held under government control. When state or local governments sell stakes in
telecommunications, banks, mines, electrical utilities, and similar other large enterprises, it is not
surprising that prospective owners would seek clarification over who is liable for retiree and worker
pension benefits when these formerly-public firms are privatized. These unfunded liabilities can be
“deal-breakers”, emphasizing the importance of accounting fully and correctly for the pension assets and
liabilities, and moving quickly to reform the plans to make their sponsors viable enterprises going
forward. This is far from a simple process, as witness the efforts of the Chinese to value pension
liabilities associated with state-owned enterprises in the last few years. The international effort to
properly account for pensions is supported by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), as it
seeks to implement an international set of common accounting and reporting standards regarding
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company assets and liabilities, including pensions, for the purposes of enhancing pension transparency
from a financial viewpoint, and corporate governance norms as well.
As governments are being asked to do more with less, and streamline other activities, this too has
led to a push to control costs associated with administering and investing in public pension plans. For
example, in some countries, public pensions have actually accumulated assets, prompting fiduciaries to
think of better ways to manage these funds (Palacios and Iglesias, 2000). In particular pension managers
are increasingly seeking ways to cut administrative costs and increase pension investment efficiency. A
comparison of various public defined contribution benefit system charges in the Latin American region is
provided by Whitehouse (2000) who expresses these both as the impact of higher expenses in terms of
lower yields on participants’ saving, or the charge treated as a one-time front-loaded fraction of the firstyear contribution:
# of

Reduction in

Charge/

Funds

Yields

Contribution

Colombia

8

0.65

13.5

Uruguay

6

0.72

14.7

El Salvador

5

0.85

17.1

Chile

8

0.88

17.7

Peru

5

0.96

19.1

Argentina

13

1.20

23.1

Mexico

13

1.39

26.0

Source: Whitehouse (2000).

Global benchmarks are now available indicating that pension investment management can be
handled for 10-20 basis points per year (or 0.1-0.2% of plan assets; c.f. Mitchell, 1999) with charges
being even lower for larger plans. This sort of information is prompting money managers to offer lowercost benefits, in regards to public plan asset management and service delivery.
In summary, in this section we have shown that defined benefit and defined contribution pensions
differ in the nature of their promise and the nature of the risks borne by employers and employees.
Though DB plans were more traditional in the public sector in past decades, defined contribution pensions
are now spreading rapidly. Evidently, in the process of public pension reform, a high priority must be
accorded to (a) determining how many and which types of employees and retirees are covered by each
plan; (b) assessing the sponsor’s liability for the entire range of benefits provided under the plan; (c)
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estimating the pension fund’s revenue flows and stock of assets; and (d) conducting a series of simulation
exercises to forecast how sensitive the survival of the pension plan is to changes in future assumptions. In
many cases, such an assessment produces unexpected or at times unpleasant results since they may
indicate that pension costs will increasingly exceed sources of financing. Yet only with a full assessment
of the public plans’ assets and the present value of pension liabilities will the full extent of the problem
become known. A valid and complete pension projection exercise is therefore essential to serve as the
impetus for reform and to assess the costs and benefits of any particular pension changes.
III. Public Pension Design and Structure
In this section we discuss the key functions of a public pension plan, what types of pension plans
exist in the public sector, what determines whether public plans are funded, and how the transition from
underfunding to funding should be handled in the public plan context.
A.

What are the key functions of a public pension plan?
All pension funds, irrespective of what kinds of employees they cover or which type of structure

they provide, have four crucial functions (see Table 1):
• Collecting contributions/taxes,
• Managing investments,
• Providing recordkeeping and reporting,
• Paying benefits to plan beneficiaries.
By collecting contributions or taxes, we refer to the plan’s responsibility to see that required
pension financing is, in fact, delivered to the pension managers. Unfortunately this is sometimes more
easily said than done in the public sector, inasmuch as pension agencies can have difficulty requiring the
sponsoring government entities to actually deposit the owed monies into the pension accounts. For
instance, state-owned enterprises in Asia have found this to be a substantial problem, leaving the pension
plan with little recourse to challenge the nonpayment (Asher, 2000). When employees are required to
contribute out of payroll, extraction of the contributions may be somewhat easier to monitor and enforce,
though here too, employers do not always deposit the monies into the appropriate accounts with alacrity.
Mexico has sought to expedite the entire pension contribution process by having the regulatory authority
require that each step take no more than a certain number of days, and it insists, for instance, that no more
than 7 business days elapse between the time the sponsor receives the contributions and the funds are
invested (Cerda and Grandolini, 1998).
The second function of a public pension is to manage investments, by which we mean the process
by which the plan assets are transferred to the capital market. This is key, of course, where there assets
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backing the promised pensions, in which case the pension system must determine the plan’s investment
policy, select its investment managers, pay the plan’s investment fees, and obtain performance reporting
as needed. Some public pension plans are required to work with stringent “legal lists” of pre-approved
investments, while others have freer rein to seek a diversified investment portfolio. In general the goal
would be to grow the fund by earning strong returns without taking unnecessarily high risk.9 Pension
system objectives and tools available to meet these objectives may be summarized as follows:
Pension System Investment Objectives:
The goal of pension system investment is to manage the assets in the pension portfolio so as to meet three
objectives:
Rate of Return Target: Maximize return consistent with preservation of capital and liquidity.
Risk Objective: Ensure that portfolio variability patterns is consistent with pension stakeholders’
risk tolerance.
Liquidity Requirements: Meet cashflow needs associated with pension benefit payments.
Elements of Pension Investment Strategy:
A pension manger has several techniques and tools to achieve the plan’s investment goals, taking into
account several strategies:
Diversification: Plans tend to hold a range of assets to meet risk/return/liquidity needs.
Active vs Passive Management: Active management involves frequent trading to meet return
objectives “higher than those of a market portfolio” for higher fees; passive management tracks
the market with infrequent trading and incurs lower fees (e.g. index funds).
In-house vs Outsourced Investment: A plan sponsor can devote own staff to managing the assets
or instead allocate to outside money managers part (or all) of the task.
Asset Allocation: Plan assets must be divided across cash (or equivalents), fixed-income
instruments, and equities, and sometimes decisions are more finely-detailed by asset class.
Choice of Sector, Quality and Duration: A pension investment expert must be aware of and
manage how assets are allocated across industrial sector, split international vs domestic, defined
by the terms on which the assets are traded, and respond to interest rates and other factors (e.g.
inflation).
Selection and Trading of Securities: The timing of asset purchases and sales as well as investment
expenses influences net pension returns and risk.

9

Global standards for investment performance have been devised and postecd on the internet by the Global
Investment Performance Standards office (www.aimr.org/standards/pps/gips_standards.html#preamble).
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Source: Derived from McGill et al. (1996: 658-667).

A third responsibility of a public pension plan is to undertake recordkeeping and reporting tasks.
The recordkeeping is essential in tracking employees who have contributed (or who have had funds
contributed on their behalf), for how long, and at what rates. These tallies are frequently essential in
establishing benefit eligibility and determining benefit levels. Supervisory or monitoring entities are also
likely to demand periodic data on the plan’s assets and liabilities, both current and projected, and these
must rely on accurately kept and personnel records kept in computer-readable formats. The reporting
tasks also include quality assessment covering services provided, grievances and resolutions, and so forth.
Last but not least is the ultimately most important task of a pension plan -- paying benefits to plan
beneficiaries. Pension systems are increasingly criticized for taking months or sometimes years to
determine retiree eligibility for benefits, to award applicants with benefits, or to determine who is eligible
for what kinds of benefit amounts. Similarly there are increasing complaints about benefits being
contested or cut, or payments delayed for long periods of time. Conversely, pension systems are
sometimes charged with fraud and abuse, as when poor governmental recordkeeping permits ineligible
persons to receive benefits.
In general then, all pension systems must undertake similar functions, and ideally discharge them
efficiently and effectively, irrespective of the specific type of public pension plan in question.
B.

What do public sector pension plans look like?
Various alternative institutional designs have been devised for public pension plans, given the

need to discharge the four tasks outlined in the previous section. Across the Americas and Europe, the
historical norm has been the defined benefit (DB) format for the most part, though with varying levels of
complexity.10 For example in the US, a state and local DB plan might define the benefit formula in terms
of a fixed multiplier, say 2% of earnings per year of service, with the base defined as three-year average
pay for the calculation (Mitchell et al 2000). These figures would generate a public pension benefit that is
higher than the typical private pension payout, where the multiplier would generally be lower (e.g. 1.75%
of last 5 to 10 years of average pay). One reason the public benefits are sometimes higher is that some
public employees (about one-quarter of the US total) are excluded from the national Social Security
scheme, so their payouts tend to compensate for the lack of Social Security coverage. Another reason
given is that public employees must often contribute to their own pension systems: for instance, US
federal workers contribute at least 5 % of pay to their pensions, and higher rates (6 –7%) apply to
teachers, police, and firefighters. Rarely are US private sector employees in DB plans required to
10

A recent study by Clark et al. (2000) shows how the early US Navy retirement system was based on the level of
war spoils the sailors brought in (more of a DC plan, in effect).
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contribute to their own pension plans out of post-tax income, and so, the argument goes, the higher
contributions imposed in the public sector can finance higher benefit levels.
One problem that sometimes emerges in the public sector pension arena is that both benefits and
contribution rates are sometimes set without ensuring that these rates are compatible with full funding of
the plan in the long run. For example, a plan that sets some fixed low contribution rate for employees and
employers may be unable to generate sufficient assets to pay out a particular defined benefit formula.
This sort of shortfall risk arises for any number of reasons, but it will happen in general terms because a
DB pension promise is inherently dynamic. Hence there will always be some requirement to adjust
contribution and benefit rates in a world where underlying experience differs from a priori assumptions
regarding salary growth, turnover and retirements, mortality, interest rates, capital market performance,
and inflation (as well as other factors examined in actuarial plan projection and funding exercises).
Therefore when pension benefit and contribution rates are set by law, in a country’s Constitution or
statute, this substantially hamstrings the actuaries’ ability to keep a DB plan at full funding. A more
flexible way of ensuring plan viability would have explicit rules to handle DB plan deviations by
implementing contribution changes, sometimes with shortfalls amortized and smoothed over a reasonably
short period of time, to target full funding in the long term.
Another problem often encountered in public pension plans is that governments have sometimes
exerted suasion over the selection and application of actuarial assumptions. This occurred for instance
with Governor Christine Whitman of New Jersey, who reduced the size of the State’s fiscal problems by
altering the discount rate assumption used to value the pension plan’s funded status (Bryan, 2000). The
role of actuarial assumptions is absolutely central to the question of how well a plan is funded, and its
importance cannot be overstated. For example a “rule of thumb” in the pension business suggests that a 2
percentage point fall in the pension plan’s assumed discount rate can boost liabilities by 25%. It is also
the case that actuaries in the DB business must draw sensible conclusions about the entire set of
assumptions that must be employed in the DB pension valuation process. In view of the key role played
by assumptions in the DB context, it is important to know which assumptions are used, how they each
and jointly can be justified, and the sensitivity of the plan’s funding status to changes in any one, or set of
several, assumptions.
Despite the fact that the DB pattern has been the norm in many public sector plans for the last 100
years, this model is showing signs of wear and even breaking in many developing and developed nations.
It is therefore interesting that there may be more diversity today than ever before in public plans, in terms
of the many different design types and structures they encompass. For example several public sector
entities have “experimented” with pension reform in a wide range of ways. At mid-2000, one expert
found that 28 of the 50 US states had enacted legislation permitting public employees to elect a defined
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contribution pension plan as a second- or third-pillar benefit plan, and several other state groups have also
indicated an interest in moving in this direction (Kaller 1999). The impetus to add a DC tier to the public
plan offerings is often described by state administrators as a way of adding to public pension benefits
while at the same time making downstream costs more predictable and controllable than in the past
(Eitelberg 2000; Fore, 2000). A few municipalities have gone even farther in this direction, offering only
a DC plan without any DB plan. An interesting variant on the movement to DC plans was recently
implemented in Florida, where the State offered public employees an initial choice between the
conventional DB plan or a new DC pension financed by a 9% employer contribution. Then the State
further will allow participants to switch back to the other plan, should they wish, at one more opportunity
prior to leaving their jobs. This switch-back option raises interesting questions regarding the value of this
choice to employees, the potential cost to the state taxpayers, and the delicate issue of how to price such a
buy-back (Lachance et al., 2000)
The last decade has seen a new “hybrid” type of pension in the pension scene, namely a cash
balance pension. This new sort of plan has elements of both DC and DB, and it was adopted over the last
decade by many of the largest Fortune 500 companies in the US (Clark and Schieber 2000). Making it
seem like a DC is the fact that the employer promises to deposit a specified fraction of each employee’s
pay into the plan. What makes it a DB in spirit, however, is that the employer guarantees the principal
and also promises that plan assets will earn some relatively low but guaranteed rate of return each year
(e.g. Treasury +1%).
There are several positive aspects of the cash-value plan design. One is that employees feel a
sense of ownership since they receive periodic reports on their accumulations and feel less exposed to
capital market risk than in the pure DC case. Relatedly, these accumulations are owned by the workers
(after meeting a vesting criterion), benefit accruals rise smoothly with pay and service, and they permit
mobility with lump sum cashouts if a worker leaves his employer. Cash balance plans are unlikely to
encourage early retirement, inasmuch as accruals continue to rise smoothly with age, and for some
employers this is an appealing alternative to DB pensions. Finally since the funding requirements are
clearer, the cash balance plan may provide a fiscally more affordable pension promise as compared to DB
models. On the other hand, it must be recalled that cash balance plans remain DB pensions in the sense
that a plan sponsor has guaranteed the specified investment return. As a result, the sponsor bears
underfunding risk and should select assets are appropriate to the structure of promised liabilities. In
reality, however, plan sponsors often overlook the importance of the cash balance guarantee when setting
investment policy, leaving them vulnerable to funding crises in years to come (Gold 2000). Nevertheless,
such plans will likely become more appealing in the public sector in years to come, inasmuch as their
accounting and funding are somewhat simpler than for the traditional DB final-pay-based pension.
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Public pension reform sometimes takes a rather different tack, where public sector employees are
folded into a national mandatory old-age retirement system. For example, Federal civil servants in the US
now have first-pillar coverage through the national Social Security system, along with second-pillar
coverage through an employer-based DB plan, and third-pillar coverage in the form of a contributory DC
plan. (This has been in effect since 1984 for all new hires in the US military and Federal personnel;
Mitchell et al., 2000). Japan and France also have strong central governments that enabled these two
countries to integrate their public sector workers into the national pension system relatively smoothly
(Bertoncino and Flanagan, 1999; Asher, 2000).
This brings up the important but not very well-studied issue of political economy, regarding the
process whereby federal and state governments interact during the public pension reform process. A key
important concern in this regard is that in order to move underfunded state and municipal plans into a
national first-pillar benefit program, policymakers have had to confront the question of how to finance
acquired rights under the old public sector employee plans. Efforts to integrate public employees into a
national old-age system have experienced variable success, with particular problems arising in Argentina
and Colombia. In Colombia, it appears as though the federal government has not yet developed the
political clout to require localities and states to get their fiscal houses in order, in exchange for the federal
government taking on the unfunded obligation of the public plans (Acosta and Ayala, 2000). A similar
problem has occurred in Argentina though the legal structure for integrating the various pension systems
was legislated in 1993 (later modified in 1995; IADB 1996). Specifically, the Federal and provincial
governments in Argentina signed a pact to transfer the provincial pension “cajas” to the federal
government, in exchange for modernization of provincial fiscal and tax systems, privatization of state
enterprises, overhauling of the national social security system, and correction of fraud and abuse in the
state pension rolls (as well as evasion). Nevertheless, the Argentinian reform process has moved rather
slowly after the Federal takeover of the unfunded pension liabilities, particularly the efforts to restructure
the provincial budgets and the national social security system (which even was found to lack its own
actuarial analysis). Related problems have arisen in India, where the many dozens of local and state plans
have substantial underfunding and excess benefits given available revenues making it difficult to integrate
them into the national old-age plan (Asher, 2000).
In any event, many public plan experts find attractive a multi-pillar concept where public
employees are integrated into the national social security system, at least far as the first-pillar level of oldage support. On top of this, a second-pillar funded DC pension (or a variety of DC accounts) could be
layered depending on the employee’s and employer’s ability to pay and interest in a funded account. A
two-tier structure of this sort can be better adapted to a more mobile workforce, it makes public and
private pay more readily comparable, and it takes advantages of scale economies available to pensions
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managed at a national (or perhaps even a supra-national or regional) level. Such a system would also
provide the minimum floor of protection important to economic security in old-age, and probably be less
costly and more efficient than the current alternative. The cost-saving results from having fewer pension
plan entities requiring technical assistance and supervision, a single reporting and accounting system, and
the clear advantage of easing worker mobility.
C. Why fund a public pension promise?
As noted earlier, a pension promise represents a long-term contract between an employer and
plan participants who either give up current salary directly (through salary reduction plans) or indirectly
(through foregone earnings) in exchange for a claim in future retirement benefits payable by the pension
plan.11 In the context of the public pension plan, trust law and international actuarial practice holds that a
pension promise is funded to the extent that assets are held in trust in a segregated account, in an amount
sufficient to finance promised future liabilities. From this perspective, the public pension obligation is a
“collateralized general obligation bond of the sponsoring public entity” to the extent that fund assets add
security to the promised benefits (Peskin 2000: 197).
Determining Pension Plan Liabilities
Collateralizing a pension promise requires the plan managers to first assess plan liabilities, a task
often undertaken by actuaries who are expected to conduct plan valuations on a periodic basis. In the
case of a DB pension, assumptions about future trends play a key role in determining plan costs,
particularly regarding current and anticipated distributions of employee age, service, and compensation
patterns along with demographic assumptions related to mortality, disability, and probabilities of
retirement. Furthermore, economic assumptions are required regarding wage increases, inflation, and
projected rates of return on plan investments (Hustead, 2000a). The resulting valuation yields an estimate
of the public pension plan's liabilities and funding consists of the contributions required to finance them
in an orderly and systematic manner through time (Mitchell et al., 2000). In a traditional DC plan, assets
are by definition equal to plan liabilities, so a DC plan is generally considered to be fully funded.
In the real world, public DB pension managers do not always do a thorough job of assessing and
aligning plan assets and liabilities, perhaps because they are not asked to do so. Alternatively sometimes
plan managers are not required to report at all: for instance in Brazil, two out of four large state pensions
recently examined proved to have very poor records regarding participation, benefit promises, and assets
(Rabelo, 2000). Furthermore, public pension actuaries are frequently given important latitude regarding
the assumptions they use in valuing the plans, and they may also exercise some judgment regarding which
method they use to determine a pension plan’s liabilities. In practice, too, public sector employers often
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employ actuarial methods and assumptions that smooth year-to-year fluctuations in contributions, even if
this produces shortfalls in funding and inadequate assets from time to time.
For all these reasons, the liability position of any given public plan may be difficult to obtain. To
make public plans more transparent over time, there has been a concerted drive in the US by the
Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB), and internationally by the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB; http://www.iasc.org.uk/). In general, the goal has been to make public pension
liability reporting confirm to common standards so that plans can be compared more readily.
Determining Pension Plan Assets
Turning to the other side of the pension balance sheet, it appears that some public pension plans
have substantial assets, while others have very little backing the benefit offerings. Also establishing a
coherent policy in this arena is far from simple, partly as a result of different historical practice. For
instance in some countries it is acceptable for DB public pension plans to value an equity or bond at its
purchase price, though according to the Government Accounting Standards Bureau (GASB) this causes
an over-optimistic portfolio valuation when the market takes a dive.
Assessing Public Pension Plan Funding
A “funded” pension plan is defined to be one with sufficient assets on hand to meet benefit
promises. In other words, the funded plan is one that controls dedicated assets (A) sufficient to pay the
present value of accrued expected pension liabilities (L). This funding concept is also known as
termination funding, since the A=L criterion asks whether a pension system can meet all its past
obligations if the sponsor were to close down the system at some moment. Not only would current retiree
payments have to be kept up, but also all past benefit promises made to still-active workers as of that date
would have to be collateralized with system assets dedicated to the plan. Other funding concepts might
be imagined, but this termination concept is the most conservative and widely used in terms of assessing
whether a plan can meet promises accumulated to date.12
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This funding concept focuses on the accrued benefit obligation (ABO), or promises made based on past service
and earnings. The ABO is consistent with the view of pensions that sees them as deferred compensation, and takes
the termination perspective discussed in the text. An alternative concept, the projected benefit obligation (PBO),
was for a time recommended in the public pensions context by the US Government Accounting Standards Board
(GASB). By projecting what current employees might receive in the future at retirement after completing their
expected work lives, the PBO helps estimate the system’s path of future revenues and obligations if the system
remains in operation through time and the plan rules remain unchanged. Interestingly, the national Social Security
system is required by Congress to produce a projected solvency measure similar to the PBO, even though US state
and local plans are not currently required to compute or use this second measure. It has been argued that the
projected concept may be more appropriate in the case of public plans (especially national ones) since they are
unlikely to terminate; on the other hand the last century has provided evidence of public pensions running out of
money, failing to pay promised benefits, and in effect going bankrupt. As a consequence, we would argue that the
termination concept is a useful one in the public arena, as well as in the private sector.
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In the international context, a wide range of funding patterns can be discerned across public
pension plans. For example, most US state and local DB plans are currently relatively well funded, a
rather remarkable feat given massive shortfalls of only a few decades ago. Public plan liabilities have
grown steadily as their workforces aged, but contributions and investment earnings until recently
produced assets amounting to about 90% of liabilities, on average. Higher funding ratios apply to the
larger state and local employee plans (90-97%) as compared to systems covering teachers and public
safety employees (82-88%; Mitchell et al., 2000). One explanation for this overall strong level of funding
is that most public plans boosted their equity investments in the last two decades, a move complemented
by the runup in stock prices through the 1990s. Whether this will be challenged by current market
volatility is a question receiving serious and ongoing study. Nevertheless, US public pension plans are
also continuing to meet 98% of their new funding requirements as they arise, suggesting a strong funding
pattern for the future.
In light of strong US state and local funding levels, it is striking to contrast the substantial level of
underfunding for US federal government pensions. That is, the federal government’s plans are short
US$1 trillion, taking both the government’s Civil Service (CSRS) pension plan (currently being phased
out) and military DB pensions. This substantial discrepancy raises a key question: why do so many state
and local pension systems boast a strong funding position, while federal plans are far less well
collateralized? One explanation may be that state and local plans invested pension assets in equities when
restrictions prohibiting this practice were lifted in the 1960’s (previously most US public pension assets
had been restricted to government bonds). As a result these plans benefited from the stock market boom
experienced during the 1980’s and 1990’s, and today US state and local pensions hold only slightly less
equity (59%) than their private pension fund counterparts (64%). US state and local plans also have some
international equity exposure, though slightly less than in private pension plans (11 vs 14 %; Munnell and
Sunden, 2000).
Another reason that state and local pensions tend to be better funded than national plans is that in
relatively small geographic regions, it tends to be difficult to pass on unfunded liabilities to others. For
example, when a pension benefit is promised to local police officers or firefighters, local residents may
reasonably believe that these benefits must actually be paid or risk having local property values fall (or
fail to receive safety and firefighting services). Hence voters might be willing to fund these pension
promises made to safety and health officers in their own geographic region for fear of losing services
later. By contrast, a taxpayer might believe that he could always defer (or avoid) paying for a national
military or civil service pension promises, in which case the national plan could be operated on a partially
or indeed completely unfunded (PAYGO) basis. Alternatively, politicians might be willing to pass these
burdens on to future generations through implicit pension debt, as long as strong economic and
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demographic growth makes this politically feasible. However when productivity falters or fertility rates
fall, the long-term obligations imposed by an unfunded system could have a more economically troubling
effect.
D. Transitioning From Unfunded to Funded Pension Plans
One of the most difficult challenges confronting politicians and public pension plan managers is
how to manage the transition from an unfunded plan to a funded one. As well known in the pension
literature (McGill et al., 1996), in an unfunded scheme today’s workers agree to support today’s retirees
in the expectation that when they retire, tomorrow’s workers will in turn support them. Once this system
is in place, moving to a funded system requires either benefit cuts and/or contribution increases.
In practice, how these costs are borne must depend on the specifics of the transition plan, and a
wide range of options is available. One approach require today’s workers to “pay twice”: that is, continue
to support today’s retirees, while also contributing something additional to build up a funded invested
account on the worker’s behalf. A different approach would cut payments to today’s retirees, enabling
workers to invest more of their contributions in funded accounts. Intermediate and perhaps more
politically palatable approaches might spread transition costs across both retirees and workers, and also
spread them into the future by having as yet unborn taxpayers bear some of the cost. How valuable these
alternatives are, in terms of social welfare, depends on how constrained today’s workers are in terms of
access to capital markets, how myopic consumers are, and how willing tomorrow’s workers are to support
their parents in retirement (Geanakoplos et al., 1998, 1999).
An area of recent discussion in this regard has to do with so-called “DROP” plans, or “deferred
retirement option plans”. This refers to a public plan feature where members are in effect permitted to
initiate retirement payments while remaining on the job (Steffen, 2000). Specifically, the DROP plan
permits an older employee to "freeze" his final retirement benefit after attaining some number of years of
service, while he continues to work in his public sector job. The monthly benefit that would have been
paid then accumulates with interest in the employee’s tax-qualified individual account; when he actually
retires, he then receives a lump-sum payment as well as the monthly pension benefit amount from that
time onward. Participants often appreciate a lump sum payment at the time of retirement, a feature that
the DROP plan offers. Employers like the fact that the eventual monthly retirement payment is frozen
based on pay and service as of when the DROP option is elected, providing them with the ability to
predict employment vacancies more reliably. In other words, while the DROP is in effect, ongoing
employment does not increase the final pension benefit. Whether the net financial cost incurred under
this arrangement is larger or smaller than the old arrangement depends on several factors including its
impact on retirement patterns, the employers’ desire to have workers remain on the job longer, the interest
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rate paid on the lump sum, and whether this also reduces the employers’ burden for other benefits (e.g.
retiree health care costs).
No unique approach to solving the transition problem will work automatically in the public
pension environment, since the weighting of costs and benefits affecting different cohorts requires a
political calculus that each country and perhaps each pension system must resolve. Nevertheless, it is
useful to illuminate some of the factors that can help make the transition costs more bearable, in the
process of public pension reform. These include adjustments usually described as “parametric” changes
(Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt, 1999) inasmuch as they involve adapting and changing the old DB system
parameters.
Among these parametric changes would be included methods of enhancing system revenues to
lower the degree of underfunding, and they can include extending the definition of covered compensation
(e.g. bonuses as well as basic pay), boosting both the tax rate and earnings limit (if any), increasing the
number of years required to contribute to the system, and raising other taxes dedicated to the public
pension system. In addition, techniques are often adopted to cut system costs, also cutting the extent of
underfunding. These generally include curtailing promises, for instance by raising the retirement age and
linking it to the life expectancy thereafter (as in Sweden), lowering the benefit formula, and limiting cost
of living adjustments.
If parametric changes of this nature are insufficient to convert an underfunded DB plan into a
funded one, more fundamental structural reforms may be attempted, and over the last two decades, many
efforts along structural lines have been undertaken throughout Latin America (see Figure 1). In Chile, for
example, hundreds of “cajas” (DB pension schemes) along with the national Social Security system
confronted bankruptcy in the late 1970’s. These were then consolidated in 1981 into the national defined
contribution pension system under the auspices of the privately-managed pension system. Large-scale
structural reforms of a similar nature have subsequently been implemented in Argentina, Bolivia,
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and several other countries, making the Latin American experience
with privatization in pension reform a model that many other countries seek to learn from (Barreto and
Mitchell, 1997).
In many of these system-wide national pension reforms, Latin American nations have tended to
recognize participants’ “acquired rights” or accrued benefits in a variety of ways. Recognition Bonds are
one such mechanism. These are government-issued, usually non-marketable, government bonds
representing workers’ claims on a future retirement benefit, in recognition of past contributions under the
old system. The issuance of these Bonds typically is carried out in tandem with parametric benefit
reductions, higher retirement ages, and/or increases in contribution years. In such a case, the explicit
obligation under the Bonds is often reduced as compared to the implicit benefit promised under the old
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system. For instance, in Chile, active workers are required to hold their Recognition Bonds until
retirement, at which time they may be redeemed them from the government. These bonds may not be
spent all at once, however, but instead are payable as a life annuity based on the face value plus some
government-determined rate of interest. Most importantly, the value of the Bond was set after lowering
promised benefits under the old system (World Bank, 1994b). In Peru, Recognition Bonds generated by
moving away from old unfunded DB plans to a national DC system were frozen in nominal terms at the
time the new national pension system was set in motion. In general, then, Recognition Bonds tend to be
used after curtailing the old public plan’s implicit debt, making the system more solvent (Mitchell, 1996).
Even so, some have expressed concern that making implicit debt explicit might also make it more
difficult for benefits to be adjusted in the future as necessary. A different approach to handle the acquired
rights problem is to recast part of the public employees’ pension as a partial guaranteed government
payment payable from the (continuing) first-pillar government-run system. This was what Uruguay did
and also what the US has done with its federal employees (Mitchell, 1996; Hustead, 2000). First-pillar
benefits in Uruguay depend on past service and earnings covered under the payroll tax system (“sueldo
basico jubilatorio”), so workers have the incentive to participate in the old system long enough to “earn”
the base benefit. The problem is that the first-pillar benefit formula provides no return for annual pay
higher than $5,000, though employer and employee payroll taxes continue to be levied on salaries above
that level. Of course this provides little incentive to report earnings over that level, even though it
somewhat reduces workers’ incentives to completely evade participation in the system altogether.
In summary, this section began by identifying the four key functions of a pension plan, namely
collecting contributions (taxes), managing funds, providing recordkeeping and reporting, and paying
benefits. To carry out these functions there are many types of public pension structures, ranging from
defined benefit pensions that may or may not be integrated with the national Social Security system; plans
that may or may not be contributory; and plans that may or may not be funded. In many countries the DB
model has dominated public pension systems, but of late several US public employers have implemented
a defined contribution pension plan as an additional tier, or in some cases have transitioned fully to a DC
plan or a hybrid cash-balance in lieu of a DB program. In other countries, including Argentina and
Colombia, there have been efforts to integrate public sector workers into the national DC pension system,
but these reforms have so far gone slowly, from all appearances. We also discuss the definition of
funding, and rationales for and means of moving to a funded public pension system, including the costs of
not funding and the ways in which accrued rights can be managed.
IV. Stakeholders in the Public Pension Arena
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In this section we identify who the stakeholders are in a public sector pension system, what this
means for relationships between interested parties in the pension contract, and what this implies for
managing public pension plans.
A. Who are the stakeholders in public pensions?
The central stakeholders in any pension system are the pension plan participants, by which we
mean active workers as well as retirees.13 As plan participants, these individuals naturally have the most
direct interest in how their pension plan is managed and governed, and indeed Western trust law holds
that a pension plan must be managed solely in the best interests of the plan participants.14
In the public sector, there are also several other parties with an interest in the design and
operation of the public pension plan. As a rule, the public sector employer(s) sponsoring the pension
maintain a strong interest in the way the plan works, how expensive it is to run, and how the pension
assets perform plan (to the extent the plan is funded). Employers are also directly concerned with how
the pension plan performs in terms of recruiting, training, and retaining governmental employees, how
well these employees understand and appreciate their pension, and eventually the role of the plan in
providing employees with an incentive to leave the plan at retirement. Employee representatives are often
also keenly interested in the operations of the pension fund, sometimes seeking influence negotiations
over benefit and contribution formulas, and other times becoming involved in controlling pension assets.
In addition, the list of public pension stakeholders can be extended to include a myriad of other
state and federal entities interested in and influential over public pensions for a wide range of reasons.
Depending on the country and the time period, these could include legislative bodies and regulators, tax
authorities, investment managers, and other entities charged with budgeting in the public domain. In the
US for instance, the Internal Revenue Service (tax authority) plays a key role in determining what pension
contributions may be set aside on a pre-tax basis, and in allowing the inside-buildup to be similarly taxfree until the payout phase. Lawmakers also play direct roles: for instance, the Florida State Legislature
held hearings on and eventually implemented a major reform in that state’s pension system covering
600,000 teachers, municipal workers, legislators, and other public employees (Trager et al., 2000). In
New Jersey, former Governor Christine Whitman actively selected pension assumptions that improved
the state DB plan’s funding status, coincident with needed financial relief in the NJ state budget (Bryan,
2000). Other government entities may also become deeply involved in public pension design issues, as
for instance when military human resource specialists alter pension retirement incentives to offset a
decline in military ranks (Hustead and Hustead, 2000).
13

In addition we would include in the set of stakeholders any terminated vested participants, as well as people in
benefit status including survivors and dependents of deceased participants.
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This holds for private sector employees under US ERISA law and also applies in the UK.
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Last, but certainly far from least, it is essential to acknowledge the role of and interests of
taxpayers, an underappreciated but nevertheless key stakeholding group in the public pension arena.
Taxpayers become important in the public pension business when states and federal entities find them
must raise tax revenue to finance pension shortfalls, if other sources of pension financing are lacking.
B. What are the implications for public pensions?
The fact that so many and varied stakeholders are involved in the public pension context gives
rise to potentially quite sharp political disputes over how to design, to pay for, and if necessary to reform
the system in question. But behind all these disputes remains the fact that changing a benefit or financing
rule always has some financial impact, on e that many politicians and political agents tend not to be able
to assess and finance. A related point is that the long-term consequences of benefit enhancements often
seem easiest to overlook in DB plans. This is because DB plans are not transparent, and as Steffen (2000:
55) notes, “what may seem like a reasonable but small adjustment to the system at present, can later result
in a significant increase in costs over the long term for all future employees”. Expanding a DB benefit
promise imposes more financing needs now and also in every future year as well, such that pension
promises can have a duration of decades or even a century. Of course, this is usually a far longer time
horizon than most politicians worry about in practice, making most stakeholders unwilling to confront the
longer term consequences of enhancing DB system benefits.
The question, of course, is who is at risk if politicians offer shortsighted and underfinanced DB
pension promises that later cannot be paid. Various possibilities may be envisioned. One is that pension
participants might suffer benefit cuts. If this were potentially a concern, plan participants (and their
agents) should find it in their interest to secure periodic actuarial assessment of the public pension
promises, require full funding of the plan to protect retirement payments, and mandate prudent
management of available pension assets to increase the probability of the payouts being met.15 In other
words, placing the participants at risk is likely to boost employees’ interests in making sure the promises
are financed and well-managed through time, as long as the employees (or their representatives) are
sufficiently well-informed to requires that prudent pension norms be implemented by plan management.
Another scenario could evolve if taxpayers were required to make good on overpromised but
underfinanced DB promises in the public pension arena. In Canada, for instance, public pension promises
are widely believed to be backed by state and even Federal constitutions, making the taxpayer the
ultimate backer of the pension promise (Pozzebon, 2000). Similarly, the view that taxpayers must
support public pension promises in Brazil has of late become a major problem, inasmuch as the high
15

An alternative is for the public employees to demand a risk premium to help compensate for the additional risk
associated with the underfunded pension plan. There is some evidence for such a risk differentials in the state of
Pennsylvania, found by Smith (1981) ; how widespread this phenomenon may be is not known.
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benefits and low tax bases limit further revenue-raising without major economic disruption (Hornbeck,
2000).
To the extent that taxpayers recognize that they are “on the hook” for public pension promises,
they should take a more active interest in public employee compensation promises of all sorts. Even
when they do not take a direct interest, a financial impact will likely be felt if some market mechanism is
available to reflect this risk. One way this has happened is when unfunded pension obligations become
capitalized into property values, as seen in several US states where public pensions were quite
substantially underfunded (Eppel and Schipper, 1981). In other words, peoples’ housing values fell
against the likelihood of having to raises taxes to pay for the public pensions in the future. Another way
pension risk can be expressed is via municipal or state bond and credit ratings, where greater risk
associated with pension underfunding influences the market for funds (Inman, 1990). In other words, the
fact that many different stakeholders become involved in the business of public pension design and
financing does not change the hard reality that making promises without paying for them does not ensure
a “free lunch”. Rather, doing so imposes potential costs on the various stakeholders that take on
economic significance, even if sometimes in unexpected ways.
The extent to which these effects are seen in developing countries has not been explored
empirically, though they are likely to be substantial. That is, high expected tax rates will depress business
interests in selecting any given location, and high tax rates can increase labor market ‘informality’ given
the easier opportunities for tax evasion that often obtain in developing country economies. Hence it is to
be expected that underfunded public pensions will have important and probably undesirable spillovers in
the poorer as well as the richer nations. In the extreme, public pension plans can go bankrupt or simply
stop paying benefits: this occurred most recently in China where state-owned enterprises have been
unable to keep the pension promises made to workers in the past.
C. How centralized should a public pension plan be?
How centralized or decentralized a public pension system can be is, in part, a reflection of the
roles played by the various stakeholders. For instance, in California, there is one public pension program
for all state government employees, the well-known California Public Employees Retirement System
(CALPERS), which is the largest funded public DB plan in the country. Other large, consolidated, statewide pensions cover public employees in several populous states such as New York and Florida, but
Pennsylvania has 2000 systems covering individual police, firefighter, teacher, judicial and other groups
in a wide range of towns and cities. Looking internationally, Singapore runs a single public Provident
Fund on a national level, while Brazil has over one thousand different plans.
An examination of how pension systems work points to several factors favoring centralization of
pension administration. Most importantly, many of the key pension tasks are managed better with
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centralization, including recordkeeping and reporting, investment management, and benefit payments.
For example, empirical analysis of US public pension administrative costs shows that total per-member
costs averaged $211/member/year across all plans, but were only one-third that size in a dollar-weighted
computation (in $1997). In other words, larger plans incurred substantially lower expense on an annual
basis (Mitchell, 2000). Furthermore, investment expenses computed as a fraction of system assets totaled
44 basis points (0.44% of assets) overall, but fell to only 27 basis points for the dollar-weighted total,
again indicating substantial scale economies. Since small differences in administrative fees can translate
into extremely large benefit payouts, the advantages of scale must be very central in deciding where to
manage a plan. Recognition of such scale economies led Mexico to establish a single national organ to
collect information and supervise centrally all employers contributing to the national mandatory DC
system recently implemented (Cerda and Grandolini, 1998).
Some might also emphasize factors favoring pension decentralization, where workers and their
jobs are heterogeneous. To the extent that a public employer might want to shape a pension offering to
meet workforce needs, it may seem easier to do so in a decentralized format. For example, some risky
occupations (e.g. police) may provide members a pension at especially early ages, whereas other public
groups might offer generous disability benefits to those injured in the line of duty. Along similar lines,
war veterans in some countries (e.g. Nicaragua) were at times awarded lifelong pensions from an early
age, as have others who served their country in times of special need.
While these benefits may seem appropriate at the time, they often prove to be overly costly and
financing them economically unsustainable in the long run. The most important pitfall here is that benefit
enhancements are easy to promise while long-term costs go under-recognized by the political process.
This can bring about pension underfunding, an inability to pay promises made, and generate
extraordinarily high tax burdens on the working population. In addition, uneven benefit formulas and
eligibility criteria can be an important obstacle to smooth movement of employees across public sector
jobs. For example, teacher shortages in one sector of the country might sensibly be met by relocating
teachers from another region, yet conflicts between pension structures for teachers in different states can
impede this sort useful and desired labor market flexibility. Finally, non-flexible pension structures can
also limit efficient movement between public and private sector jobs, as when pension rules serve as an
obstacle to having eminent private citizens serve the government, and vice versa.
Some of these mobility problems arise because DB plans are usually ill-suited to permit worker
movement across employers. This is cannot be seen as a design “flaw,” since most DB plans were
intentionally engineered to deter labor mobility. Yet in an increasingly-mobile labor market, workers are
less likely to find DB plans appealing for this reason. Employers too may find the more flexible DC-type
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plans more suited to their workplace needs, inasmuch as these may mesh better with performance-based
compensation schemes that will increasingly be used in the public as well as private sectors.
In summary, in this section we have identified the stakeholders in a public pension system, what
the implications are for the way a public pension system is managed, and some of the issues that arise
when deciding the ‘best’ level at which to design and manage a public plan. In general, centralization of
public pensions tends to cut administrative and investment costs, ensures more accurate accounting of
benefit promises, and is the most efficient in terms of labor market consequences. In addition, DC plans –
particularly at larger scale – can be more cost-effective than DB plans.
V. Governance and Investment in the Public Sector Pension Environment
In this section we discuss what public pension plan governance is, define what is meant by
pension fiduciary standards, and outline the key challenges in the public pension plan investment arena.
A. What is pension governance?
A well-functioning public pension plan would be governed by a management structure ensuring
that operations are well-managed and managers accountable, just as in a for-profit (and non-profit)
organization. In practice, public retirement systems tend to be run by a public retirement Board having
authority for decisions related to pension financing, system operations, actuarial valuations, and in some
instances investments and plan benefits provided. Depending on the plan and the country in question,
day-to-day administration may be handled by a dedicated pension system staff, or by employees of the
government entity sponsoring the system.
Thus far relatively little is known about public pension governance structure and its impact on
pension outcomes. In developed countries, decisions regarding the structure and composition of these
public pension Boards can become quite political. For instance, in the US, most public Board members
are appointed by politicians or serve ex officio. 16 This practice is similar to that of Brazil, Malaysia,
Singapore, and other countries (Bertoncino and Flanagan, 1999). The role of politics is highlighted since
these Boards undertake a wide range of financial and related tasks including paying benefits,
administering the plan, setting pension investment policy and often bearing responsibility for asset
allocation and actuarial assumptions needed to determine plan funding and contribution obligations
(Mitchell et al., 2000).
In the US, DB public pension plans tend to be run by a Board ranging in size from one to two
dozen; however the “typical” size is around eight people with more for larger systems (e.g. state
employees and teachers tend to have 9-10) and fewer in systems serving public safety and general local
16

Some systems, such as the Iowa Public Employee Retirement System, operate without a board of trustees, relying
instead on authority vested in a senior official of the sponsoring agency (Mitchell et al., 2000).
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employees (7-8). It is also worth noting that Board composition depends on the type of covered
employees, so that plans covering teachers and public safety employees have more elected members and
fewer appointed members than do systems serving general state and local employees as a whole. Still,
day-to-day administration tends to be carried out by a pension staff under the supervision of the Board
executive director or plan administrator, though in very small plans the sponsor’s finance or human
resources department may carry out the tasks. Public pension staff sizes range from a single individual
working part-time, for a very small plan, to more than 200 staffers for plans covering several hundred
thousand public employees. In general, the average public plan has about 2.6 staffers per 1,000 active
members, with the larger systems including state employees and teachers averaging 1.5 staffers per 1,000
participants, the lower number reflecting economies of scale.
In a case where public employees participate in a DC rather than a DB pension plan, the role of
the pension Board is of necessity rather different in spirit. In the case of the US Civil Servants TSP, for
instance, the Board focuses on selecting which asset investments each individual participant may invest
his contributions in, including (e.g.) a stock index fund, a bond fund, a money market account, and
perhaps a government securities account. The DC Board is also charged with selecting the fund money
managers and record keepers, ideally using competitive bids to ensure that the funds made available are
performing as intended and curtail costs to a minimum. In this way the individual participant has
substantial freedom regarding where to invest his money, but the Board retains the authority to select and
terminate money managers based on service and performance.
B. What are pension fiduciary standards?
Public pension Boards, when they are working well, manage the public plan as fiduciaries,
governing the plans “in the participants’ best interests”. As noted above, US public pension systems
have responsibility for overseeing pension investments and as such, must operate under fiduciary
standards to ensure that assets are on hand to pay promised plan benefits. In the US private sector,
corporate pension fiduciaries must also meet additional standards set by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), requiring that private pension funds must be invested using the “care,
skill, and diligence” of a prudent individual acting “solely in the interest” of plan participants.
Though this Federal “prudent person” regulation does not formally apply to state and local
pension plans, it is interesting that almost 90% of all public plans have adopted virtually identical
language, meaning that the spirit and philosophy of Western trust law is carried over to the public sector,
too. In addition, two-thirds of public pension Boards now require written ethical standards that members
must abide by, limiting conflicts of interest; these standards have been championed by the California
Public Employee Retirement System in recent years. Finally, in the public sector virtually all plans have
adopted an obligation to prepare annual actuarial valuations and are subject to annual actuarial audits.
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Additional controls are in place to ensure widespread use of annual independent investment audits. All of
these reporting and disclosure requirements contribute to a more transparent public pension environment
for all concerned stakeholders.
C. Public pension plan investment impacts
Public pension Boards serve as the appointed or elected agents for government and pension
system participants, and as such they are the fiduciaries responsible for the plan’s asset management task.
It stands to reason that no public pension governing board would be expected to deliberately drive its
assets down, nor its costs up (Useem and Mitchell, 1999). In other words pension trustees are expected to
share the same objective of enlarging the plan assets within the limits of prudent investment risk and
reasonable administrative cost.
In practice, of course, retirement systems engage in widely varying investment strategies, some of
which directly or indirectly affect public pension financial performance. After reviewing Latin American
pension systems, Srinivas and Yermo (1999:1) conclude that regulatory regimes “create distortions in
asset management, limit opportunities for diversification, and as a consequence, hamper the performance
of pension funds.” Those authors recommend that governments should instead press for market indexes
and benchmarks, and require money managers to forecast likely benefit replacement rates at retirement
instead of focusing on contributions and investment restrictions.
To determine how these influence outcomes, it is of interest to examine key investment decisions
that pension managers make, and about which empirical evidence is readily available (Useem and
Mitchell, 2000). In a recent survey on US public plans, three-quarter of the public plans were found to
use long-term considerations in deciding on their asset allocation criteria, rather than “tactical investing,”
in accord with varying economic conditions. Also over three-quarters of all state and local systems
outsourced their assets management; some plans held a substantial portion of their investment assets in
equities; and most public plans have not invested much outside the US.
It is also important to examine areas of pension plan governance where the impact on investment
strategies is potentially greatest. The first has to do with investment restrictions that currently apply to
only one-quarter of all US public plans. The second indicates whether the pension fund conducts an
independent annual evaluation of its performance; the third asks whether the pension Board sets asset
allocations and whether the board is directly responsible for investments; the fourth focuses on the size
and composition of the board on the groups that a pension fund with a smaller Board might be expected to
stress tactical investing and to outsource asset management, while the fraction of trustees who are
themselves active or retired members of the retirement system may affect the actuarial assumptions
followed by the pension fund .
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The results indicated that good governance practices did influence public pension plan investment
strategies, and investment strategies in turn shaped the financial performance of the investment portfolio.
Four governance policies – investment restrictions, performance evaluations, board purview, and board
composition/size – proved to have an important link with public plan investment strategies. Two of the
investment strategy variables, notably equity and international investing, were associated with higher fund
performance the following year, controlling for other factors. These findings suggest that asset allocation
accounts for a large element of the difference in returns among retirement systems and the magnitude of
these effects is substantial. Some governance policies have more important impacts on pension fund
performance: for instance having regular independent evaluations of system investment strategies and few
restrictions on those strategies is likely to beneficial.
In addition to assessing how governance structure influences DB public plan investment policy, it
is also of interest to ask how the specific nature and mix of DB public plan liabilities might influence
investment practice. Michael Peskin, a prominent actuary and investment manager, argues that the proper
objective of the pension manager should be to “provide intended benefits at the lowest cost”, achievable
by “integrating assets, liabilities, and funding within a corporate finance framework” (2000:195).
Specifically, he advocates matching pension asset durations with plan liability durations, for example
backing cash payments to retirees with long-term bonds, while using more equity-like instruments to fund
benefits promised to those workers not-yet-retired. Such an approach can make the long-run financing of
the plan more economical, and reduce taxpayers’ risk of having to boost DB plan contribution levels
suddenly and unexpectedly.
D. Controversies regarding public pension investment policy
For several reasons the investment practices of public pension plans have come under scrutiny in
the last few decades. One is that governmental entities have sometimes failed to hold pension managers
to prudent person fiduciary standards, instead imposing caps or upper limits on the types of assets held in
public plan portfolios. For example, in Canada, public plans are prohibited from holding more than 20%
of their assets in non-Canadian assets (Pozzebon, 2000). Similarly some US public sector pensions face
restrictions in terms of maximum ceilings that can be held in certain forms (e.g. venture capital), and
systems in many other countries are likewise constrained (Palacios and Iglesias, 2000) Asset investment
in Japanese pension funds until recently were restricted mainly to fixed income domestic holdings, due to
regulatory caps known as the “5-3-3-2” limits. These were government regulations that required trust
banks to hold no more than 50% of the assets in guaranteed assets (bonds), a maximum of 30% in
domestic stocks, 30% in foreign assets, and 20% in real estate (insurers were held to the 3-3-2 limits;
Mitchell 1999). As a result, many Japanese pensions experienced very low (and sometimes negative) real
returns over the years and have as a result faced serious underfunding problems.
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Alternative mechanisms to control pension investment risk would include the “prudent man” rule
under which pension plan fiduciaries can be held personally liable if the plan is not managed for the sole
benefit of the plan participants (Mitchell et al., 2000). This is easier if the pension system is required to
mark its assets to market (e.g. daily, as in the US 401(k) pension world) and make public any key
assumptions regarding liability and investment accounting. And perhaps equally important, if pension
participants have the ability to move their funds from one pension plan to another, and to sue managers if
necessary, this may have a beneficial impact on retirement system investment management and
performance. It is likely, in this context, that having competition across fund managers will in the long
run impose downward cost pressure on the system as a whole, thus reducing fees and increasing net assets
available for investing.
In general, plan stakeholders must learn to take responsibility for monitoring system performance
and exercise their rights to “exit” a specific fund should performance be unsatisfactory. A companion
approach would require public pension Board members to purchase trustee insurance which has the effect
of enhancing pension funding and raising investment returns, probably because insurance premiums rise
where pension system malfeasance is apparent (Hsin and Mitchell: 1994, 1997). In this way, the insurer
can function as an agent for the stakeholders to improve fund management.
In the DC pension context, it is often easier for the pension manager to avoid direct
confrontations regarding pension investment options, since selecting the portfolio mix is generally left to
the individual participant within the menu of offered investment options. Nonetheless, even in this
context, pension investment issues can become critically important. One reason is that the plan sponsor
still bears some responsibility for employee financial education, helping participants understand risk and
return and the importance of investment diversification. Another is that if markets falter, participants may
worry that they have insufficient funds to retire on and some might seek benefit guarantees from their
plan sponsor. In fact some DC pension systems implemented in the Latin American context have actually
adopted minimum return or benefit guarantees, benefit floors that are thus far not well understood nor
pre-financed in any careful way (Pennacchi, 1999). Hence a public plan sponsoring a DC pension with a
guarantee may become vulnerable to investment fluctuations, if due care is not exercised to ensure that
the DC is not converted into a DB promise.
In summary, this section describes public pension plan governance, defines pension fiduciary
standards, and outlines the key challenges in the public pension plan investment arena. Ideally in the case
of a DB plan, the pension Board must make key asset allocation decisions with the pension liability
position very much in mind. In the DC case, the Board must focus on which funds an individual
participant may invest in, and undertake some investment education for the plan participants. In both
cases a well-functioning Board must act in the participants’ best interests, focusing on investment risk and
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return while seeking to hold down investment and other expenses. We also argue that holding pension
fund managers to the prudent man rule, requiring competitive bids for investment and recordkeeping, and
requiring regular independent evaluations of investment strategy and performance, have more positive
effects on the plan participants than will government efforts to limit plan investments to one or a few
assets.
VI. Implications for Public Pension Reform in Developing Countries
Ideally a public pension system – like a private pension system – should be self-sustaining and
not experience repeated financing crises. Many developing countries have taken several steps to reform
public sector pensions, as mentioned above, and they appear headed in the direction of making promises
made more credible. However much remains to be done to provide sustainable and credible retirement
benefits that are self-sustaining, equitable, and efficient for the various stakeholders.
Above we have suggested that many of the problems identified in a wide range of Latin nations
could potentially be rectified by consolidating the nation’s public and private first pillar old-age systems.
Specifically, public employees could be integrated for pension purposes into the national DB plan to
provide a first-pillar level of old-age protection. Next, a consolidated second-pillar plan could be
established, one permitting funding, some investment choice, and worker mobility and portability for
accruals above some minimum. An architecture of this sort was implemented recently for US Federal
employees, with all workers required to move into the national Social Security system for basic benefits.
On top of this, the federal government created a Federal Thrift Saving Plan (TSP) which is a funded DC
plan offering employees several low-cost investment options, portability, and transparency (see Hustead
and Hustead, 2000).
In order to build such a plan in developing nations, it would be necessary to centralize
recordkeeping and improve the governance, regulatory structure, and investment environment in which
the public pension system operates. Many have indicated that the environment for private and
occupational pensions is in need of increased reporting and disclosure regarding investment management
and performance, relaxation of investment requirements, and increased and more careful supervision
(World Bank, 1995). Since most of these public plans require long vesting periods and do not currently
permit portability, this undermines the plans’ incentives to compete with each other to perform better and
attract new customers.
It would appear that a few key issues must be resolved in order to achieve consolidation of public
pension plans with a national retirement system. One problem has to do with the widespread dearth of
information regarding unfunded liabilities burdening the Federal, state, and municipal entities. To
remedy this problem, states and municipalities may be integrated into a central recordkeeping mechanism
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in order to measure and track pension assets and obligations. This process is data-intensive, complex, and
requires skilled actuarial input, so it is encouraging that this effort has already been launched in some
states (Rabelo, 2000). It will, no doubt, require further technical and professional support to simply arrive
at an assessment of public sector pension debt in the nation.
As a second step toward reform, the question of curtailing acquired rights must be resolved, or at
least the structure be put in place to resolve it over time. This is a problem to the extent that some state
systems were never conceived of as funded programs from their inception (Rabelo, 2000). Finding a
solution for this underfunding will be an expensive and long proposition. It appears that the Brazilian
Ministry of the Economy has the authority to “make transfers of tax revenues to states and municipalities
from the so-called ‘Fondos de Participação’ contingent upon the clearance of their debts vis a vis social
security” (World Bank, 1995). And also positive is the news that several Brazilian states have recently
adopted required contribution rates for retired and active employees (e.g. in Amazonas, Pernambuco,
Sergipe, Parana, Mato Grosso, and the Federal District; Pinheiro, 1999). Maranhao and Ceara are
working to implement a similar plan, with feasibility studies underway in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and
Minas Gerais. A handful of states have apparently already created retirement funds to pay for the
transition, with the most well-financed to date being Bahia that received R$440M as a result of the
privatization of the electricity and water utilities. However no state has sufficient state assets to fully fund
its benefits promised to public sector employees, making this process a slow one at best (World Bank,
2000).
Some analysts working in this area believe that there is room for a larger federal government role,
providing incentives for states and municipalities to join the national first-pillar system and thus to halt
the accumulation of potentially non-payable benefits under the old defined benefits pay-as-you-go
system. One possibility is that more could be done to foster the creation of positive externalities, and to
assist plans in reaching a minimum efficient scale. For example, in Mexico, the Social Security agency
has established a national record-keeping system that all employers must use to submit their contributions
to the system This also provides the data flow necessary for effective centralized supervision and data
analysis, also centrally managed. Similarly in other countries, the federal government might provide
technical assistance to the states and cities, ranging from compatible computer software systems, offering
actuarial training and expertise, and instituting a national and common recordkeeping system. Another
possibility is that federal governments could offer partial transition financing as an incentive to help states
and municipalities reform and sometimes terminate their insolvent pension systems.
Despite the potential for federal incentives to assist the transition, the financial shortfalls facing
most public pension systems are such that lowering benefits may be inevitable. This can be accomplished
in several ways, by raising retirement ages, raising the number of years of contribution required, reducing

35
benefit indexation, and reducing evasion. This might also happen by terminating the various public
pension plans, with some portion of benefits protected by offering a recognition bond which payable in
retirement. Because most plan stakeholders recognized that the public underfunded DB promise is
unlikely to be paid off in full, it is plausible that the bond needed to pay off this risky promise could well
be substantially less than the expected value of the promise (Kane, 1995; Mitchell and Zeldes, 1996).
Another issue is that moving the reform process forward as well as the Brazilian pension system
as a whole will require a central governmental structure to supervise and oversee responsibility for new
state and local pension plans set up under the reform. One construct would move toward a national DC
pension system operated under a single, centrally run, regulatory and tax structure similar to that adopted
in Mexico (Cerda and Grandolini, 1998). Thus far public pension regulation in developing countries is
often handled by several different institutions. For instance in Brazil, the Insurance Supervision agency
(under the Ministry of Finance) overseeing so-called “open funds” and the Secretaria de Previdência
Compelementar (under the Ministry of Social Affairs) managing the “closed funds”. This creates
duplication and potential conflict between agencies that could be rectified by concentrating the regulatory
and informational oversight into the hands of a single government agency.17
Another approach might be to adopt a national cash-balance plan for public sector workers, where
workers would have individual accounts credited annually with specified contributions and guaranteed
rates of return on the funds. Above we have pointed out the pros and cons of a cash-value format,
particularly the fact that they offer a principal and investment-earnings produce guaranteed by the plan
sponsor. But this guarantee has pitfalls as well as benefits, since stakeholders tend to be unaware of the
downside liability that such a promise can impose.18
A related and very supportive development would be the adoption of clear and systematic tax
regulations as well as rules permitting portability and competition in pension management (Pinheiro
1999). There is uneven treatment in most developing nations, as to the tax status of various types of
pensions, and it would be useful to streamline these regulations not only between private plans but also
between public and private pensions. In some cases, state-owned pension funds charge far more for
administrative costs than do their private-sector pension counterparts, with public plan costs running over
9% of contributions versus under 3% for multinational firms (World Bank, 2000). This differential
should be rectified by requiring greater uniformity in reporting and recordkeeping, as well as by allowing
17

There is also some rationale for giving a single agency oversight over the private pension savings accounts
(similar to US Individual Retirement Accounts) that are known as FAPIs, as well as mutual funds and other related
savings vehicles. Recognizing the increasing overlap between banking, pensions, insurance, and saving instruments,
Australia and the United Kingdom have recently adopted a more centralized regulatory structure for all these
financial institutions.
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In the extreme case, this type of plan can be completely unfunded, as in the case of Latvia and the second-pillar
Swedish pension under the new reform.
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participants to switch their deposits from one pension system to another, if costs seem unduly high.
Similarly it has been argued that public-sector DB pension funds in the past over-invested in real estate,
producing inadequate fund diversification and hence increasing risk (World Bank, 1995). The adoption
of “prudent man” fiduciary rules of the sort described above would also have a beneficial influence on
investment practices of the funds, though allowing participants to switch providers periodically would
also have an effect on holding down costs.
A final issue to note, though one beyond the scope of the present study, is the urgent need to
separate out what is properly payable as a pension benefit from other sorts of social insurance benefits
that public plans have often paid in the past. For instance, the Colombian social security reform separated
its pension from its health plan, from benefits payable by the disability and unemployment systems
(Acosta y Ayala, 2000). Similarly, in Mexico, reforming the old-age system necessitated separating the
pension program from the country’s national disability insurance scheme, the latter of which the
government still runs. Such plan separation is generally advised so as to make each of the individual
insurance programs operate more transparently, to reduce administrative costs, and to reduce crosssubsidization which makes all plans work less efficiently.
B. Next steps
This analysis has immediate implications for the path to public pension system reform in
developing nations. In all likelihood, further progress will likely require progress along the following
fronts to achieve a sustainable old-age system for public sector employees:
Public-private comparability studies are needed to determine where public sector employees may
be overpaid, and to judge how to better structure public employee compensation and performance
measurement systems;
Data must be gathered and analyzed to derive long-term solvency and funding estimates for the
state and municipal pension systems over the next 50-75 years, as well as to evaluate which
additional reforms would be most helpful in reducing the public pension systems’ financial
solvency problems;
It is often easier to manage a pension system when the public pension system’s benefit and
contribution formulas are not prespecified in explicit legislation, as has sometimes been true in
developing countries;
Public sector employees could be more fully integrated into the national first-pillar DB
contributory system, like private sector workers, instead of maintaining thousands of different
unfounded and less-than-efficient existing DB plans;
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A national second-pillar contributory DC funded system could be established for public sector
workers, one that is portable, affordable, and encourages household saving, while having a higher
probability of paying benefits at a later retirement age;
A coherent system of pension governance and performance standards could be implemented
under central government guidance, including investment and expense benchmarks for pension
managers to ensure top-notch performance and protect against political intervention in the
investment process;
The federal government generally must devise a recordkeeping and reporting system for
employees covered by public pension plans. This can be linked to other datasources as well for
recordkeeping purposes (e.g. mortality and tax information);
Tax policy toward public and private retirement systems could be developed in a coherent, costeffective and transparent manner to ensure enhanced reporting and supervision over contributions
and asset management. This would also permit more participant choice in plan investment,
enhance participant confidence in the system, and facilitate worker mobility.

In summary, these changes will improve the nature of the public sector pension promise in
developing nations, while making it equitable, economically efficient, and financially solvent. In addition
the reforms would benefit not only the employer and employee groups most directly associated with the
pension systems, but also they could ultimately enhance the wellbeing of broader groups of pension
stakeholders. These include not only taxpayers and consumers on whom the burden of high taxes and
reduced public services will ultimately fall, but also participants in the private sector pension regime as
well.
VII. Conclusions
A retirement system is a long-term financial contract to deliver old-age benefits to retirees. As
such, it is a complex financial institution, appreciated by employees for their risk-pooling, scale
economics, tax-deferral and self-control attributes; and by employers for their ability to attract, motivate,
and retain workers in accordance with desired employment patterns. All retirement plans are not identical,
however, since different types of plans offer distinct sorts of benefits and different risk-sharing between
plan sponsors, plan participants, and other stakeholders.
A diverse range of designs has proliferated around the world over the last hundred years for
pensions in the public sector. Until recently, the most prominent model for public sector employee
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pensions was the defined benefit approach, but now public plans are catching up with the global transition
toward alternative types of pension architectures and away from DB plans. In the future, cash balance
plans that combine aspects of both defined benefit and defined contribution plans may become
increasingly interesting to the public sector.
Evidently, in the process of reforming public pensions, high priority must be accorded to several
factors:
Determining how many and which types of employees and retirees are covered by each plan;
Assessing the sponsor’s liability for the entire range of benefits provided under the plan;
Estimating the pension fund’s revenue flows and stock of assets, and
Conducting a series of simulation exercises to forecast how sensitive the survival of the pension
plan is to changes in future assumptions.
In many cases, such an assessment tends to indicate that projected pension costs are far in excess of
available pension financing. Such a projection exercise is essential, nevertheless, in order to prompt
reform and to assess the costs and benefits of any given set of pension changes.
We have identified the four key functions of a pension plan, namely collecting contributions
(taxes), managing funds, providing recordkeeping and reporting, and paying benefits. To carry out these
functions, many types of public pension structures are available, some of which are integrated with a
national Social Security system; some of which are contributory on the employees’ part; and some of
which are funded with dedicated assets backing benefit promises. In many countries, the DB model has
dominated public pension systems, but of late some states and municipalities have implemented a defined
contribution pension plan as an additional tier, or transitioned to a hybrid cash-balance plan or a DC plan.
In the case of Argentina and Colombia, there have also been efforts to integrate public sector workers into
the national DC pension system, but these reforms have gone slowly. We also discuss the rationales for
and means of moving to a funded public pension system, including the problems associated with
underfunding and the ways that accrued rights can be financed.
We have also indicated who the stakeholders are in a public pension system, what the
implications are for the way a public pension system is managed, and some of the issues that arise when
deciding the ‘best’ level at which to design and manage a public plan. Centralization of public pension
management can curtail administrative costs, greatly reduce investment costs, ensure more accurate
accounting of benefit promises, and be more efficient in terms of labor market consequences. As a result,
large-scale DC plans can be more cost-effective than DB plans, depending on choices made about system
design and structure.
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The last topic examined is public pension plan governance and investment practice. It is widely
agreed that pension fiduciaries must govern their plans in the participants’ best interests. The prudent
man concept arising from Western trust law stipulates that pension funds should be invested using the
“care, skill, and diligence” of a prudent individual acting “solely in the interest” of plan participants. In
practice this implies that public pension Boards must abide by written ethical standards limiting conflicts
of interest, report and account to members with annual actuarial valuations and audits, all of which help
engender a more transparent public pension environment for all concerned stakeholders. This in turn
implies that public pension fund investment can be maintained in the context of a competitive structure,
producing a positive effect on plan participants as compared to traditional efforts to limit plan investments
to one or a few assets.
Without a doubt, there is a pressing need to improve the design and functioning of public sector
pensions in developing as well as developed nations. As we have shown, a series of key reforms could in
most cases be implemented, in the process of making pension plans covering public sector workers more
equitable, more efficient, and financially more sustainable. These reforms would benefit not only the
employer and employee groups most directly associated with the pension systems, but they can also
enhance the wellbeing of broader groups of pension stakeholders. These include taxpayers and consumers
on whom the burden of high taxes and reduced public services will ultimately fall.
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Table 1. Retirement System Performance Standards and Quality Measures
Service Provided
Issue SS Numbers

Output Measure
How many issued
accurately per year

Pay benefits correctly

Benefit expenditures

Pay benefits on time

Personal contact

Number of telephone
calls, letters, visitors

Maintain accurate
earnings records

No. of contributors,
Amt. of contributions

Source: Adapted from Mitchell and Sunden (1994)

Standard
•Chances assigned in 24 hrs
of receiving documentation
•Issue SSN correctly
•Correct SSN probs <30 days
•Goal of 100% accuracy
for Initial payment
•100% accuracy goal
for lifetime payment
•Accurate DI determinations
•First benefit check within
15 days of filing for old-age benefits
•Regular old-age benefits
paid on schedule
•DI benefits paid w/in 6 mos.
of disability or 60 days of filing
•Denied claims noticed w/in
60 days, 120 days for hearings,
90 days for review of appeal
•<= 15 min.wait time in field
office w/ appt.; 30 min. w/o
•Accurate handling of phone
calls in <= 24 hours
•Post earnings accurately
•Earnings posted w/in 6 mos.
of end of tax year
•Resolve earnings diffs. w/in
30 days
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Figure 1. Pension Reforms by Region
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